We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, plurality voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Introduction
Classical social choice studies problems where a …xed set of agents have to choose an outcome from a given set of outcomes, and agents have preferences only over this set. However, there are settings where, depending on the chosen outcome, some agents might want to leave the society; and this, in turn, might be perceived by some agents that were initially willing to remain in the society as negative, and now they might also want to leave. For instance, membership in a political party may depend on the positions that the party takes on issues like the death penalty, abortion or the possibility of allowing a region of a country to become independent.
A professor in a department may start looking for a position elsewhere if he considers that the recruitment of the department has not being satisfactory to his standards; and this, in turn might trigger further exits. To be able to deal with such situations the classical social choice model has to be modi…ed to include explicitly the possibility that initial members of the society may leave it as the consequence of the chosen outcome and hence, preferences have to be extended to order pairs formed by the …nal society and the chosen outcome.
There is a large literature that has already considered explicitly the dependence of the …nal society on the choices made by the initial society. 1 Barberà, Maschler and Shalev (2001) , Barberà and Perea (2002) , and Berga, Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2004, 2006, 2007) study alternative models in terms of the voting methods used to choose the outcome and the timing under which members reconsider their membership. In this note (as we also do in the companion paper Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2016)) we look at the general setting without being speci…c about the two issues. We do that by considering that the set of alternatives are all pairs formed by a subset of the original society (an element in 2 N ; the subset of agents that will remain in the society) and an outcome in X. Then, we assume that agents'preferences are de…ned over the set of alternatives 2 N X and satisfy two natural requirements. First, each agent has strict preferences between any two alternatives, provided he belongs to at least one of the two corresponding societies. Second, each agent is indi¤erent between two alternatives, provided he is not a member of any of the two corresponding societies; namely, agents that do not belong to the …nal society do not care about neither its composition nor the chosen outcome.
We consider rules that operate on this restricted domain of preference pro…les by selecting, for each pro…le, an alternative (a …nal society and an outcome). In Bergantiños, Massó, and 1 See for instance Roberts (1999) for problems related to club formation and Sobel (2000) for the declining of standards in societies that chose their members. Neme (2016) we characterize the class of strategy-proof, unanimous and non-bossy rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.
For applications where the pro…le is common knowledge (and hence, the strategic revelation of agents'preferences is not an issue) we focus on internal stable and consistent rules. 2 Internal stability says that nobody can force an agent to remain in the society if the agent does not want to do so. This is a minimal requirement of individual rationality, and it is a desirable property whenever membership is voluntary. A rule is consistent if the following property holds. Apply the rule to a given pro…le and consider the new problem where the new society is formed by the subset of agents chosen at the original pro…le. A consistent rule has to choose, at the subpro…le of preferences of the agents that remain in the society, the same alternative.
Thus, a consistent rule does not have to be reapplied after an alternative has been chosen.
Internal stability and consistency are desirable if we want to interpret the alternative chosen by the rule as being the …nal one, in a double sense. Members of the …nal society want to stay and if the rule would be applied again to the …nal society it would chose the same …nal society and the same outcome, so there is no need to do so.
We adapt well-known voting methods to our setting with the goal of making them either internally stable or consistent, or both. We show that plurality voting and scoring methods do not satisfy consistency. However, approval voting not only satis…es internal stability and consistency but it also satis…es e¢ ciency and neutrality. Finally, we show that the Condorcet winner is internal stable, consistent, e¢ cient, neutral and anonymous at those pro…les where an alternative beats all other alternatives by majority voting (namely, whenever it is a well-de…ned rule).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains the de…nitions of the properties of rules that we are interested in. Section 4 contains the analysis of well-known rules from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Preliminaries
This section follows closely Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2016) . Let N = f1; : : : ; ng, with n 2; be the set of agents who have to chose an outcome from a given set X of possible outcomes. We are interested in situations where some agents may not be part of the …nal society, perhaps as the consequence of the chosen outcome. To model such situations, let A = 2 N X be the set of alternatives and assume that each i 2 N has preferences over A.
Observe that for all x 2 X, (?; x) 2 A; so we are admitting the possibility that the …nal society does not have any member. We will often use the notation a for a generic alternative (S; x) 2 A; i.e., a (S; x), a 0 (S 0 ; x 0 ); and so on. Let R i denote i's (weak) preference over A; where for any pair a; a 0 2 A; aR i a 0 means that i considers a to be at least as good as a 0 :
Let P i and I i denote the strict and indi¤erence relations over The fact that agents'preferences satisfy (P.1) is the reason why our model cannot mechanically be embedded into the classical model. A speci…c analysis is required, partly because properties like internal stability and consistency become specially meaningful under this domain restriction. We see property (P.1) as being a natural assumption for our setting, and it is a critical requirement for our results to hold. Let R i be the set of preferences of i satisfying (P.1) and (P.2), and let R = i2N R i be the set of (preference) pro…les.
We denote the subset of alternatives with the property that i is not a member of the corresponding …nal society by
[?] i = fa 2 A j aI i (?; x) for some x 2 Xg : 
The top of R i ; denoted by (R i ) ; is the set of all best alternatives according to R i ; namely,
To be explicit about the two components of the alternative chosen by f at R; we
To clarify the model, we relate it with the two examples used in the introduction. The set of agents N corresponds to the initial members of the political party, the set of outcomes X to the set of choices that the political party has to make and the set S, if the chosen alternative is
, to the set of …nal members of the party that stay after it supports outcome x. Similarly, N corresponds to the set of professors in the department, the set of outcomes X to all subsets of candidates and the set S; if the chosen alternative is (S; x); to the set of professors who remain in the department after the subset of candidates x has been hired.
Properties of rules
In this section we present several properties that a rule may satisfy. The …rst two impose conditions at each pro…le.
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency For each R 2 R there is no a 2 A with the property that aR i f (R) for all i 2 N and aP j f (R) for some j 2 N:
The next property is related to the stability of a rule, and it captures the idea that agents are able to exit a society at their free will. Internal stability says that no agent belonging to the …nal society would prefer to leave it.
Internal stability For all R 2 R and all
It is immediate to see that internal stability is indeed equivalent to the requirement of to select the alternative. To de…ne it formally, let : N ! N be a permutation of N (i.e., a one-to-one mapping). Given i 2 N; (i) is the agent assigned to i after applying to N: The set of all permutations : N ! N will be denoted by : Given S 2 2 N and 2 N we denote by (S) the subset of agents associated to S by ; namely, (S) = fi 2 N j (j) = i for some j 2 Sg: Given R 2 R and 2 we denote by R the new pro…le where, for all i 2 N; agent (i) has the preference obtained from R i after replacing each (S; x) by ( (S); x):
A rule is neutral if the names of the outcomes do not play any role in selecting the social alternative. To de…ne it formally, let : X ! X be a permutation of X. Given
is the outcome assigned to x after applying to X: The set of all permutations : X ! X will be denoted by : Let Y X be non-empty and 2 . Denote by (Y ) the subset of outcomes associated to Y by ; namely, (Y ) = fx 2 X j (y) = x for some y 2 Y g: Given In contrast with the standard notion, our consistency property requires to re-apply the rule only to the (non-empty) set of agents that has been selected at the original pro…le. We think that this is the relevant consistency notion because the new composition of the society is not just a hypothetical circumstance, it is a fact. And indeed, the new set of agents might be willing to reconsider their membership and the chosen outcome; particularly because, in the choice of the later, preferences of members that are not anymore in the society may have played a relevant role. Consistency says that the original choice, if re-evaluated by the new society by means of the same rule, will continue to be chosen.
We say that a rule satis…es any of the above properties at R if the condition de…ning the property holds at R:
Internally stable and consistent rules
In Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2016) we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and non-bossy rules as the family of serial dictator rules. Here, we consider situations where the strategic manipulation in the preference revelation game is not an issue and we will look for internally stable and consistent rules. To do so, we …rst ask whether three of the most prominent procedures in classical social choice satisfy them. Recall that in the classical setting the goal is to select an outcome, from a given set X, taking into account (partially or fully) the strict preferences of agents over X: The rules we consider are:
1. Approval voting. Each i 2 N votes for a subset X i of X: For each outcome x 2 X, compute the number of votes received by x; namely, jfi 2 N j x 2 X i gj : The outcome with more votes is selected. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever two or more outcomes obtain the largest number of votes. Note that approval voting is not a rule because i's vote X i is not completely determined by P i :
2. Plurality voting. Each i 2 N votes for an outcome x i 2 X: The outcome with more votes is selected. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever two or more outcomes obtain the largest number of votes.
3. Scoring methods. Each i 2 N strictly ranks all outcomes. Assign to each outcome a pre-established decreasing number of points depending on its position in i's ranking. 3 Compute the sum of the points obtained by each outcome. Select the one with more points. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever two or more outcomes obtain the largest number of points.
We tentatively adapt the three voting methods to our setting to deal with the indi¤erences generated by (P.1) and to de…ne approval voting as a proper rule. Example 1 below shows that none of these extensions satisfy internal stability. Since we are interested in identifying rules satisfying internal stability, we modify the previous methods by considering only votes to alternatives (S; x) that are internally stable for each i 2 S according to R i ; namely, only alternatives (S; x) with the property that (S; x) P i [?] i for each i 2 S can receive votes, not only from i but also from all other agents (we call these alternatives unanimously internal stable). In approval voting each agent votes, among the set of alternatives at which he is a member of the society, only for those that are unanimously internal stable. If no alternative receives a vote the rule selects a particular alternative (?; x) by a tie-breaking rule that will be described later. In plurality voting each agent votes for his best unanimously internal stable alternative. In a scoring method we consider only the rank, given agents'preferences, among the unanimously internal stable alternatives. 4 Hence, at the pro…le of Example 1 each i votes for [?] i and (?; y) is selected according to some preestablished y: With these modi…cations the three methods satisfy internal stability by de…nition. Denote by f P and f B the plurality voting and the Borda method, respectively.
Our …rst result is negative: plurality voting and Borda method do not satisfy consistency (independently of the rule used to break ties). 5 To see that, consider Example 2 below.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and X = fy 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 ; y 4 ; y 5 g be the set of agents and outcomes and consider the following R 2 R: For each i; (S; x) P i [?] i whenever i 2 S. In 4 To obtain the vote of an agent we have to use information contained in the full pro…le, but since we are not considering the strategic aspect of preference revelation, this is not an issue. 5 It is easy to see that no scoring method is consistent.
addition, R is one among all pro…les satisfying the following properties, where the …rst column indicates the rank of each of the six preference relations.
Rank
First (N; y 1 ) (N; y 2 ) (N; y 3 ) (N n f6g ; y 4 ) (N n f6g ; y 4 ) (N; y 5 )
Second (N n f6g ; y 1 ) (N n f6g ; y 1 ) (N n f6g ; y 1 ) (N n f1g ; y 4 ) (N n f1g ; y 4 ) Third (N n f6g ; y 4 ) (N n f6g ; y 4 ) (N n f6g ; y 4 ) (N n f2g ; y 4 ) (N n f2g ; y 4 ) Fourth (N n f3g ; y 4 ) (N n f3g ; y 4 )
Fifth (N n f6g ; y 1 ) (N n f6g ; y 1 )
:
First, plurality voting does not satisfy consistency since f P (R) = (N n f6g ; y 4 ) but at the same time f P R jN nf6g = (N n f6g ; y 1 ). It is possible to select a pro…le R 0 satisfying the above rankings in such a way that f B (R 0 ) = (N n f6g ; y 4 ) but f B (R 0 jN nf6g ) = (N n f6g ; y 1 ) : Hence, the Borda method is not consistent.
Approval voting satis…es not only consistency (and internal stability by de…nition) but also other desirable properties. Before stating this result we need to specify a tie-breaking rule, to be used whenever two or more alternatives obtain the highest number of votes. Let be a monotonic (strict) order over 2 N : Namely, for each pair S; T 2 2 N such that S ( T , T S:
Observe that N S for all S 6 = N:
Fix a monotonic order over 2 N : Denote by f AV; the approval voting that uses to break ties. Formally, let A 0 = f(S k ; x k )g K k=1 be the set of alternatives that have received the largest number of votes according to approval voting at R. If S k = ? for all k, select (?; y) where y is such that (N; y)P i (N; z) for all z 6 = y and fig fjg for all j 6 = i. Assume S k 6 = ? for some k. First select the society S 2 fS 1 ; :::; S K g ranked highest by and consider the subset of alternatives f(S k 0 ; x k 0 ) 2 A 0 j S k 0 = Sg : Select again the agent i 2 S who is ranked highest by (as a singleton set) and choose …nally as f AV; (R) the alternative most preferred by i among those in the family f(S k 0 ; x k 0 ) 2 A 0 j S k 0 = Sg : Proposition 1 below states that any approval voting f AV; is internally stable, consistent, and additionally satis…es other desirable properties.
Proposition 1 Let be a monotonic order over 2 N : Then, the approval voting f AV; satis…es internal stability, consistency, e¢ ciency and neutrality. Moreover, in the subdomain of pro…les where the tie-breaking rule is not applied, f A; satis…es anonymity.
Proof Observe that if (S; x) is approved by i; then i 2 S: This fact will be repeatedly used in the proof. has been approved at R by more agents that any other alternative: Hence, f AV; (R ) = ( (f AV; (R)); f AV; X (R)); which means that f AV; satis…es anonymity at R:
We end this note by applying the Condorcet winner to our setting. First, we recall the de…nition of the Condorcet winner in the classical setting. Fix a pro…le P of strict preferences over X and let x; y 2 X be such that x 6 = y: We say that x beats y if the number of agents preferring x to y is strictly larger that the number of agents preferring y to x: We say that
x is a Condorcet winner at P if there is no y that beats x: There are pro…les at which no Condorcet winner exists and others at which there are several Condorcet winners. Thus, the Condorcet winner is not a rule.
We adapt the notion of a Condorcet winner to our setting as we have already did for the previous three rules. In order to ensure that the chosen alternative satis…es internal stability at R we only consider votes for unanimously internal stable alternatives at R. When several Condorcet winners exist we apply the tie-breaking (using a monotonic order ) used to de…ne approval voting.
We say that a pro…le R 2 R is resolute if there exists a 2 A such that a beats a 0 for all a 0 6 = a: Thus, the Condorcet winner selects a at R: Neutrality. Observe that for each (T; y) 6 = (S; x) ; (S; (x)) beats (T; (y)) at R : Hence, f C; (R ) = (S; (x)) ; which means that f C; satis…es neutrality at R:
Anonymity. Observe that for each (T; y) 6 = (S; x) ; ( (S); x) beats ( (T ); y) at R :
Hence, f C; (R ) = ( (S); x) ; which means that f C; satis…es anonymity at R:
Nevertheless, for non-resolute pro…les the Condorcet winner, even when it is unique, may not satisfy consistency. To see that, consider the following example.
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and X = fy 1 ; y 2 g the set of agents and outcomes and let be any monotonic order satisfying f1g f2g f3g f4g f5g. Consider any pro…le R satisfying the following properties, where the …rst column indicates the rank of each of the …ve preference relations.
First (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N; y 1 )
Second (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N; y 1 ) (N; y 1 ) [?] 5 Third (N; y 1 ) (N; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 )
Fourth :
The only internally stable alternatives are (N n f5g ; y 1 ) ; (N n f5g ; y 2 ) ; and (N; y 1 ) : At R;
(N n f5g ; y 1 ) ties with (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (so they do not beat each other), (N n f5g ; y 2 ) beats (N; y 1 ) and (N; y 1 ) beats (N n f5g ; y 1 ). Therefore, R is not resolute because (N n f5g ; y 2 ) does not beat (N n f5g ; y 1 ) : Since (N n f5g ; y 2 ) the unique Condorcet winner (no alternative beats it), First (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 )
Second (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N n f5g ; y 2 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 ) (N n f5g ; y 1 )
Third : At R jN nf5g , (N n f5g ; y 1 ) ties with (N n f5g ; y 2 ) and they beat all other alternatives. Hence, the two are Condorcet winners at R jN nf5g : Thus, applying the tie-breaking rule , and since 1 prefers (N n f5g ; y 1 ) to (N n f5g ; y 2 ) ; we have that f C; R jN nf5g = (N n f5g ; y 1 ) ; which means that f C; does not satisfy consistency.
